Suspicion and False Positives

Five men, including an Israeli and four Angolans, were detained by airport security authorities in Newark, NJ yesterday, after a US Air Marshal called in a report of ‘suspicious passengers on board’ an inbound American Airlines flight from Dallas-Fort Worth. The men were apparently speaking in foreign languages (Portuguese) and carrying aircraft flight materials, which caused passengers – and the Air Marshal – to become suspicious (although officials would not comment on exactly what about the men aroused suspicion).

Upon landing in Newark, the men were detained (searched, handcuffed, and taken into custody), but they were released a short time later when it was discovered that they were returning from helicopter flight school in Texas. Four of the men belong to the Angolan military (The New York Post online edition, reporting a day after the incident, still elected to entitle their article “TERROR SCARE ON NEWARK FLIGHT,” and to propose that “Five foreign nationals caused an air scare on an American Airlines flight to Newark Airport yesterday …”).

After the passengers became suspicious, the Air Marshals and a DEA agent onboard the flight took up positions to guard the plane, according to the New York Times. Also from the Times “Some passengers interviewed last night said there was nothing suspicious about the men. The men acted like "a group of people traveling together who didn't get seats together," said Barbara O'Reilly, 66, a passenger from Tulsa, Okla. "I was really surprised" that they were taken into custody, she said.”

The Times reports that, despite the ‘false positive’ scenario that took place, an FBI spokesperson feels that “"We would never second-guess anyone who sat through this," he said. "We'd rather people report their observations. That's exactly what happened here."”

Press releases from officials on this incident are apparently unavailable, except via media reports. In searching for a statement from the Newark Liberty International Airport (maintained and operated by the New York / New Jersey Port Authority), I checked the NLIA website. The front page didn’t offer any information on the incident, but I was struck by the prominent ‘Report Suspicious Activity’ link. The whole event aboard the American Airlines flight was, after all, a reaction to ‘suspicious activity.’ Clicking on the link takes you to a big .pdf poster with a red background and white lettering that says: “Now’s the time to report something, not when it’s on the news. If it looks suspicious, it is suspicious.”

If it looks suspicious, it is suspicious.

It’s a simple statement, but it’s also a launching point for an exploration of the psychology of suspicion and vigilance that has emerged in the United States and elsewhere under the guise of post-September 11 anti-terrorism efforts. The four Portuguese-speaking Angolans aboard the flight clearly ‘looked suspicious’ to the Air Marshalls and some of the passengers; enough to warrant a secure landing procedure and their detention and questioning, at least. Of course, despite the FBI’s position that the passengers and marshals acted in a textbook fashion, there has been no official statement as to exactly what it was about the actions of the men that was suspicious.

In December 2005, US Air Marshals shot and killed a man with bipolar disorder who had failed to take his medication, behaved erratically, and claimed to have a bomb (which he did not). Clearly this behaviour aroused suspicions. There are training manuals and publications that articulate ‘official’ positions on what constitutes suspicious behaviour regarding terrorism. The International Association of Chiefs of Police, for example, have published ‘training keys’ (number 581 and 582) regarding suicide bombers that clearly articulate a checklist of attributes that ought to arouse suspicion (check out no. 581 for a review of attributes). British Metropolitan Police affiliated with Operation Kratos profiled, shot, and killed Jean Charles de Menezes based on a similar specialized knowledge of what constitutes suspicious activity (shortly after he was shot eight times, it was discovered that de Menezes was not a suicide bomber).

The sort of profiling and the doctrine of pre-emption that underlies the IACP training keys, Operation Kratos, the December 2005 Air Marshal action, the July 2005 shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes, and – most likely – the detention of the Angolan passengers is problematic and worthy of close scrutiny. As we have seen, not all ‘false positives’ lead to a few hours’ worth of detention and questioning. But the Newark Airport poster speaks to something altogether more generalized, and I would argue, more insidious. The London Metropolitan Police have used similar posters in their recent anti-terrorism campaign (entitled ‘You Are That Someone’).

What we see in these campaigns is the official endorsement of attitudes of generalized suspicion and mistrust. If it looks suspicious, it is suspicious. If you see something, say something. Officially, four Angolan men speaking Portuguese and looking at flight manuals on an airplane cannot be described as suspicious activity, but when Air Marshals and passengers react to it with suspicion, it is considered a ‘textbook’ example of what ought to be done. It is recommended that citizens be vigilant and imaginative in their roles as unofficial anti-terrorism agents. Posters in the UK call on the public to watch out for suspicious vehicles, transactions, tenants, and storage facilities. The Newark poster goes a step further and suggests that no suspicion is invalid. In a time where embracing the precautionary principle and engaging in pre-emptive prevention is seen the gold standard in counter-terrorism (and indeed war), a tremendous emphasis is placed on suspicion at the same time that the importance of verification is waning. It goes without saying (or, at least, it ought to) that generalized suspicion of the ‘other’ is not a characteristic associated with functioning democratic societies. Increasingly, though, campaigns that seek to generate anxious citizen-informants are becoming accepted in Western states, with the stated goal of protecting the nation against terrorism. The damage that such campaigns cause to the fabric of society – the net loss in the public experience of security and trust and the maintenance of paranoia – is considered to be a reasonable price to pay for the opportunity to gather information about suspicious activity.

In conclusion, though I can’t claim to be an expert on the scientific method, it seems to me that there is something wrong (broken, even) with a system that applauds false positives and encourages the behaviour that leads to them.

- Mike L